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1. Introduction
There has been much interest in game-theoretic models
of industry evolution and, in particular, in the framework
introduced by Ericson and Pakes (1995) that is at the heart
of a largeand growing lite raturein industrial organiza-
tion and other ﬁelds (see Doraszelski and Pakes 2007 and
the references therein). Ericson and Pakes (1995) provide
a model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic indus-
try with investment, entry, and exit. Their framework is
designed to facilitate numerical analysis of a wide variety
of phenomena that are too complex to be explored in ana-
lytically tractable models. Methods for computing Markov-
perfect equilibria are therefore a key part of this stream
of research. This paper contributes by providing a step-by-
step guide to solving dynamic stochastic games using the
homotopy method.
Computing a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a dynamic
stochastic gameamounts to solving a largesyste m of e qua-
tions. To date, the Pakes and McGuire (1994) algorithm
has been used most often to compute equilibria of dynamic
oligopoly models. This backward solution method falls into
the broader class of Gaussian methods. The idea behind
Gaussian methods is that it is harder to solve a large sys-
tem of equations once than to solve smaller systems many
times, and that it may therefore be advantageous to break
up a large system into small pieces.
The drawback of Gaussian methods is that they offer no
systematic approach to computing multiple equilibria. The
potential for multiplicity in the Ericson and Pakes (1995)
framework is widely recognized; see p. 570 of Pakes and
McGuire(1994) and, morere ce ntly, thee xample s of mul-
tiplee quilibria in theonlineappe ndix to Dorasze lski and
Satterthwaite (2010) and in Besanko et al. (2010a). To
identify more than one equilibrium (for a given parame-
terization of the model), the Pakes and McGuire (1994)
algorithm must be restarted from different initial guesses.
However, different initial guesses may or may not lead to
different equilibria. A similar remark applies to the stochas-
tic approximation algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (2001),
the other widely used method for computing equilibria.
This, however, still understates the severity of the prob-
lem. When there are multiple equilibria, the trial-and-error
approach of restarting the Pakes and McGuire (1994) algo-
rithm from different initial guesses is sure to miss a sub-
stantial fraction of them, regardless of how many initial
guesses are tried: As shown by Besanko et al. (2010a),
if a dynamic stochastic gamehas multiplee quilibria, the n
someof the m cannot possibly becompute d by thePake s
and McGuire (1994) algorithm. It is important, therefore,
to consider alternative algorithms that can identify multiple
equilibria and thus provide us with a more complete picture
of the set of solutions to a dynamic stochastic game.
Thehomotopy me thod allows us to e xplorethee quilib-
rium correspondence in a systematic fashion. The homo-
topy method is a type of path-following method. Starting
from a single equilibrium that has already been computed
for a given parameterization of the model, the homotopy
algorithm traces out an entire path of equilibria by varying
one or more parameters of the model. Whenever we can
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the path bending back on itself, then the homotopy method
is guaranteed to identify them. We note at the outset that
it is not assured that any given path includes all possible
equilibria at a given value of the parameter vector.
In this pape r wediscuss thethe ory of thehomotopy
method as well as HOMPACK90, a suite of Fortran90 rou-
tines developed by Watson et al. (1997) that implements
this method. To explore the equilibrium correspondence of
a dynamic stochastic game, we set up the homotopy algo-
rithm to vary oneor moreparame te rs of themode l. This
type of application is referred to as a natural-parameter
homotopy. We discuss potential problems that one may
encounter in using HOMPACK90 in this way and offer
someguidanceas to how to re solvethe m.
We present two examples of dynamic stochastic games
and show, step by step, how to solve them using the
homotopy method. In order to use the homotopy method,
one must formulate a problem as a system of equations.
Our ﬁrst example, the learning-by-doing model of Besanko
et al. (2010a), is particularly well suited for the homo-
topy method because it is straightforward to express the
equilibrium conditions as a system of equations. We dis-
cuss in detail how this is done. Moreover, we illustrate the
computational demands of the homotopy method using the
learning-by-doing model as an example.
Our second example, the quality ladder model of Pakes
and McGuire (1994), presents a complication. As invest-
ment cannot be negative, the problem that a ﬁrm has to
solve is formulated using a complementary slackness con-
dition, a combination of equalities and inequalities. We
show how to reformulate this complementary slackness
condition as a system of equations that is amenable to the
homotopy method.
In sum, this paper provides a step-by-step guide to
solving dynamic stochastic games using the homotopy
method. Our goal here is to enable the reader to start using
HOMPACK90 as quickly as possible. To this end, we also
makethecodefor thele arning-by-doing and quality ladde r
models available on our homepages. The code is accom-
panied by additional detailed instructions on how to set up
and useit.
2. The Theory of the Homotopy Method
A Markov-perfect equilibrium of a dynamic stochastic
game consists of values, i.e., expected net present values
of per-period payoffs, and policies, i.e., strategies, for each
player in each state. Values are typically characterized by
Bellman equations and policies by optimality conditions
(e.g., ﬁrst-order conditions). These equilibrium conditions
depend on the parameterization of the model. Collect-
ing Bellman equations and optimality conditions for each
player in each state, the equilibrium conditions amount to
a system of equations of the form
H x   =0  (1)
where H  N+1 → N, x ∈ N is theve ctor of unknown
values and policies, and 0 ∈ N is a vector of zeros.   ∈
 0 1  is the so-called homotopy parameter.1 Depending on
theapplication at hand, thehomotopy parame te r maps into
oneor moreof theparame te rs of themode l. Theobje ct of
interest is the equilibrium correspondence
H
−1 =  x    H x   =0  
Thehomotopy me thod aims to traceout e ntirepaths of
equilibria in H−1 by varying both x and  .
To this end, we deﬁne a parametric path as a set of func-
tions  x s    s   such that  x s    s   ∈ H−1. Thepoints
on thepath areinde xe d by theauxiliary variables ;a sw e
movealong thepath, s either increases or decreases mono-
tonically; however, neither x nor   necessarily vary mono-
tonically. Differentiating H x s    s  =0 with respect to
s yields
 H x s    s  
 x
x
  s +
 H x s    s  
  
 
  s =0  (2)
where  H x s    s  / x is the  N × N  Jacobian of H
with respect to x, x  s  and  H x s    s  /   are  N ×1 
vectors, and    s  is a scalar. This system of equations
captures the conditions that must be satisﬁed in order to
remain “on path.” As this is a system of N differential equa-
tions in N + 1 unknowns, x 
i s , i = 1     N, and    s ,
it has many solutions. Although these solutions differ by
monotonetransformations of s, they all describe the same




i s = −1 
i+1det
  






i =1     N+1  (3)
where y s  =  x s    s    and thenotation  · −i is used
to indicatethat thei th column is removed from the
 N × N +1   Jacobian  H y s  / y of H with respect to
y. A proof that the basic differential equations (3) satisfy
theconditions (2) for re maining on path can befound in
Garcia and Zangwill (1979) and on pp. 27–28 of Zangwill
and Garcia (1981).
An implementation of the homotopy method—a homo-
topy algorithm—can beuse d to traceout e ntirepaths
of equilibria by numerically solving the basic differential
equations (3). An already computed equilibrium provides
theinitial condition. From the rea homotopy algorithm use s
the basic differential equations to determine the next step
along the path. In this manner, it continues to follow the
path step by step.
Regularity and Smoothness Requirements. A closer
inspection of the basic differential equations (3) reveals a
potential difﬁculty. If the Jacobian  H y s  / y is not of
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Figure 1. Examples of solution paths if H is regular (left panel) and not regular (right panel).


































determinant of each of its square submatrices is zero. Thus,
according to the basic differential equations (3), y 
i s = 0,
i = 1     N + 1, and thehomotopy me thod is stuck at
point y s . A central condition in the mathematical liter-
atureon thehomotopy me thod is thus that theJacobian
must havefull rank at all points on thesolution path. If
so, thehomotopy is calle d re gular. Moreformally, H is
regular if rank  H y / y  = N for all y ∈ H−1. There gu-
larity requirement—and a certain smoothness requirement
to be discussed below—ensures that the set of solutions
H−1 consists only of continuous paths. The left panel of
Figure1 shows e xample s of possiblesolution paths if H
is regular: (A) paths that start at   = 0 and end at   = 1,
(B) paths that start and end at  =0o r =1, (C) loops, and
(D) paths that start at  =0o r =1 but never end because
x (or a component of x in thecaseof a ve ctor) te nds to
+  or − .2 Theright pane l of Figure1 shows e xam-
ples of solution paths that are ruled out by the regularity
requirement: (E) isolated equilibria, (F) continua of equilib-
ria, (G) branching points,3 (H) paths of inﬁnitele ngth that
start at   = 0o r  = 1 and conve rgeto singlepoints (spi-
rals), and (I) paths that start at  =0o r =1 but suddenly
terminate.
In practice, it is often hard to establish regularity because
the Jacobian of a system of equations that characterizes
thee quilibria of a dynamic stochastic gameformulate d
in the Ericson and Pakes (1995) framework tends to be
intractable. This stems partly from the fact that the Jacobian
for such a syste m is typically quitelargebe causethesyste m
includes at least two equations (Bellman equation and opti-
mality condition) for e ach stateof theindustry, and e ve n
“small” models with few ﬁrms and few states per ﬁrm tend
to have hundreds of industry states.
The other major requirement of the homotopy method
is smoothness in the sense of differentiability. This yields
solution paths that aresmooth and fre eof sudde n turns
or kinks. Formally, if H is continuously differentiable in
addition to regular, then the set of solutions H−1 consists
only of continuously differentiable paths. This result is
known as the path theorem and essentially follows from
the implicit function theorem (see, e.g., p. 20 of Zangwill
and Garcia 1981). Moreover, for a path to be described by
thebasic diffe re ntial e quations (3), it must bethecasethat
H is twice continuously differentiable in addition to reg-
ular. This result is known as the BDE theorem (see, e.g.,
pp. 27–28 of Zangwill and Garcia 1981).
The smoothness requirement is nontrivial and easily vio-
lated, for example, by nonnegativity constraints on compo-
nents of x, say because investment cannot become negative,
or by distributions with nondifferentiable cumulative dis-
tribution functions such as theuniform distribution that is
often used to model random scrap values and setup costs.
Section 5 explains how to deal with such complications.
There is a subtle difference between the homotopy
method, a mathematical theory, and the homotopy algo-
rithm, a numerical method. In theory, the homotopy method
is used to describe solution paths. In practice, a homotopy
algorithm takes discrete steps along such a path. This can
be beneﬁcial because the homotopy algorithm may suc-
ceed in tracing out a solution path even if the regularity
and/or smoothness requirements are violated; as the homo-
topy algorithm proceeds along the solution path in discrete
steps, it may skip over points at which one or both of these
requirements are violated. However, this also can lead to a
complication. As the homotopy algorithm proceeds in dis-
crete steps, it may jump from one solution path to another,
thus failing to trace out either path in its entirety. These
issues are discussed further in §5.5.
3. The HOMPACK90 Software Package
HOMPACK90 is as a suite of Fortran90 routines that traces
out a path in
H
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Normal ﬂow FIXPNF FIXPNS
Augmented Jacobian FIXPQF FIXPQS
Thenotation y =  x   ∈ N+1 underlines that the homo-
topy method does not make a distinction between the
unknown variables x ∈N and the homotopy parameter  ∈
 0 1 . Here we just give a brief overview that is meant to
enable the reader to start using HOMPACK90 as quickly as
possible. A detailed description of HOMPACK90 is given
in Watson et al. (1987, 1997).
To useHOMPACK90, theuse r must provideFortran90
codefor thesyste m of e quations and its Jacobian. In addi-
tion, theuse r must supply HOMPACK90 with an initial
condition in theform of a solution to thesyste m of e qua-
tions for a particular parameterization. HOMPACK90 then
traces out a solution path. HOMPACK90 offers several dif-
ferent path-following algorithms as well as storage formats
for theJacobian of thesyste m of e quations. Table1 give s
an overview. Below we proceed to discuss the differences
between the various path-following algorithms and storage
formats as well as ways to generate initial conditions. In
§4.3 wethe n comparetheimplications of thevarious path-
following algorithms and storageformats for thepe rfor-
manceof HOMPACK90.
The output of HOMPACK90 includes a sequence of
solutions to the system of equations, saved to binary ﬁles,4
and an exit ﬂag that indicates a normal ending or several
kinds of failure . Wediscuss someof thepote ntial proble ms
in §5.5.
3.1. Path-Following Algorithms
HOMPACK90 traces out a parametric path y s  ∈ H−1 as
a sequence of points, indexed by k. The kth point in the
sequence is  sk yk , where yk is understood to represent
y sk . Theste p along thepath from onepoint to thene xt
starts by choosing  s = sk+1 − sk. HOMPACK90 adjusts
this step length based on the curvature of the path. Then
HOMPACK90 computes the next point yk+1 using a two-
phase method. The predictor phase generates a guess for
yk+1; the corrector phase then improves this guess using
a version of Newton’s method. The difference between
thevarious availablepath-following algorithms lie s in the
implementation of the predictor and corrector phases.
ODE-Based. The predictor phase directly applies the
system of differential equations (2). It ﬁrst solves the sys-
tem of linear equations
 H yk 
 y
 y =0 (4)
to obtain  y and then computes the guess for the next point
as yk+1 =yk+ y s. As this predictor step tends to be very
precise, typically several such steps are executed before a
corrector step becomes necessary.
Normal Flow. The predictor phase uses a Hermite cubic
extrapolation from the previous two points as a guess for
thene xt point. Although theHe rmitecubic e xtrapolation is
much easier to compute than solving the system of linear
equations (4), it is also much cruder. The corrector phase
is thus necessary at every step.
Augmented Jacobian. Thepre dictor phaseis thesame
as in thenormal ﬂow algorithm, but theaugme nte d
Jacobian algorithm takes a different approach to the cor-
rector phase (quasi-Newton instead of Newton steps).
3.2. Jacobian
HOMPACK90 requires the user to provide a routine that
returns the Jacobian  H y / y at a given point y. Dueto
theke y roleof theJacobian in thehomotopy algorithm, we
next discuss some details on ways to compute and repre-
sent it.
Numerical vs. Analytical Jacobian. The easiest way
to computetheJacobian is to do so nume rically using a
one- or two-sided ﬁnite-difference scheme (see, e.g., Chap-
ter 7 of Judd 1998). However, we found that, due to the lim-
ited precision of numerical differentiation, the ODE-based
algorithm takes small steps, and this signiﬁcantly increases
the time needed to traverse an entire path; normal ﬂow and
augmented Jacobian algorithms are more robust to impre-
ciseJacobians.
Theobvious solution is to useanalytical inste ad of
numerical differentiation, but this carries a high ﬁxed cost
of deriving, coding, and debugging the Jacobian. Instead,
we turn to automatic differentiation, a technique for gen-
erating computer programs with statements for the compu-
tation of derivatives based on the chain rule of differential
calculus. Automatic differentiation relies on the fact that
every function, no matter how complicated, is executed on
a computer as a sequence of elementary operations (addi-
tion, multiplication, etc.) and functions (exp, sin, etc.). By
applying thechain ruleove r and ove r again to thecomposi-
tion of those elementary operations, one can compute, in a
completely mechanical fashion, a derivative of the function.
WeuseADIFOR to automatically diffe re ntiateFortran
code. ADIFOR is described in Bischof et al. (1996); here
wejust givea brie f ove rvie w. 5 Theinput to ADIFOR is
theFortran90 codethat re turns H y  at a given point y.
ADIFOR analyzes the code and from it generates new code.
This code receives a pair of   N +1 ×1  vectors  y  y 
and returns the  N ×1  vector
 H =
 H y 
 y
 y 
Thus, weobtain thej th column of theJacobian via a sin-
gle call to the ADIFOR-generated code with  y set to the
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This column-by-column approach is necessary because
the ADIFOR-generated code never computes the elements
 Hi y / yj of theJacobian  H y / y explicitly, but instead
transforms  y  y  into  H in a process that parallels
thecomputation of H y . For example, if H y1 y 2  =
u y1 v y2  is a function of thescalars y1 and y2, where
u and v are themselves functions, then the ADIFOR-
generated code computes
 u =u
  y1  y1 
 v  =v
  y2  y2 
 H  =u y1  v+v y2  u 
Dense vs. Sparse Jacobian. In many applications,
including dynamic stochastic games, the number of equa-
tions and unknowns is large, but any given equation
involves only a small number of unknowns (because the
transitions from onestateto thene xt aretypically re stricte d
to a small set of “nearby” states), leading to a Jacobian
comprising mostly zeros. Such a Jacobian is called sparse
and can be more efﬁciently represented using a sparse
matrix storageformat that consists of a list of thenonze ro
elements with corresponding row and column indices rather
than as a de nsematrix that consists of thee ntirese t of
N N+1  elements.
Taking advantageof thesparsenatureof theJacobians
in dynamic stochastic games offers a decrease in compu-
tation time, and in fact we show in §4.3 that this decrease
is substantial. The additional efﬁciency comes from lower
memory requirements and faster linear algebra operations.
In addition, the Jacobian of a very large system of equa-
tions may exceed the available memory unless it is stored
as a sparsematrix.
Theuseof sparseJacobians is complicate d by two issue s.
First, there is additional coding because the user must spec-
ify the “sparsity structure,” i.e., the row and column indices
of potentially nonzero elements. In practice, this means
going through the system of equations and identifying the
elements of y that appear in a given equation.
Se cond, thesparseand de nseve rsions of thevari-
ous path-following algorithms take different approaches to
solving systems of linear equations. In all cases, the lin-
ear algebra routines in HOMPACK90 were selected for
speed, not reliability, which means that they can and do
fail for certain problems. Our experience has been that the
sparse linear solver is more likely to fail than the dense
linear solver; §5.6 provides further detail and offers some
solutions.
3.3. Initial Condition
Theﬁnal input to HOMPACK90 is an initial condition
in theform of a solution to thesyste m of e quations for
the particular parameterization associated with   = 0. In
some cases, if the parameterization associated with   = 0
is trivial, thesolution can bede rive d analytically. A good
e xampleis thecaseof a ze ro discount ratethat turns a
dynamic stochastic game into a set of disjoint static games
played out in every state. Another example is a particu-
lar parameterization that makes movements through state
spaceunidire ctional and thus allows thegameto besolve d
by backwards induction (see, e.g., Judd et al. 2007).
More generally, a solution for a particular parame-
terization can be computed numerically using a number
of approaches such as Gaussian methods including (but
not limited to) the Pakes and McGuire (1994) algorithm,
other nonlinear solvers (see Ferris et al. 2007), and arti-
ﬁcial homotopies (see Zangwill and Garcia 1981, Chap-
ter 1), which can also be implemented using HOMPACK90.
Finally, onecan usea solution obtaine d by tracing out
a path along a different parameter as an initial condition
(se e§5.1 for an e xampleof path following along se ve ral
parameters).
4. Example 1: The Learning-by-
Doing Model
We begin with the learning-by-doing model of Besanko
et al. (2010a). The description of the model is abridged.
Please refer to Besanko et al. (2010a) for economic moti-
vation and greater detail on some derivations.
4.1. Model
Firms and States. We consider a discrete-time, inﬁnite-
horizon stochastic game. Firm n∈ 1 2  is described by its
stock of know-how (or experience) en ∈ 1     M .A ta n y
point in time, the industry is completely characterized by a
vector of ﬁrms’ states e =  e1 e 2  ∈  1     M 
2. We refer
to e as thestateof theindustry. Weusee  2  to denote the
vector  e2 e 1  found by interchanging the stocks of know-
how of ﬁrms 1 and 2.
Each pe riod, ﬁrms obse rvethestateof theindustry and
set prices for their respective goods. By making a sale, a
ﬁrm can add to its stock of know-how. At thesametime ,
theﬁrm face s thepossibility of organizational forge tting,
leading to the law of motion e 
n =en+qn−fn, where e 
n and
en areﬁrm n’s stock of know-how in the subsequent and
current period, respectively, the random variable qn ∈ 0 1 
indicates whether ﬁrm n makes a sale, and the random
variable fn ∈  0 1  represents organizational forgetting. If
qn =1, theﬁrm gains a unit of know-how through le arning
by doing, whereas it loses a unit of know-how through
organizational forgetting if fn =1.
Learning by Doing. Firm n’s marginal cost of produc-
tion c en  depends on its stock of know-how en through a






n if 1en <m 
 m  if men M 
where   = log2 . Marginal cost decreases by 100 1−  
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lower progress ratio implies a steeper learning curve. The
marginal cost of production at thetop of thele arning curve ,
c 1 ,i s >0, and m represents the stock of know-how at
which a ﬁrm reaches the bottom of its learning curve.
Organizational Forgetting. Theprobability that ﬁrm n
loses a unit of know-how through organizational forget-
ting is
  en =Pr fn =1 =1− 1−  
en 
where  ∈ 0 1  is the forgetting rate.
Demand. Each period, one (nonstrategic) buyer enters
the market and purchases a unit of the good from one
of thetwo ﬁrms. Thene t utility of good n t oab u y eri s
v−pn + n, where pn is theprice , v is the ﬁxed component
of utility, and  n is a stochastic component that captures the
buyer’s idiosyncratic preference for good n. Thebuye r’s
idiosyncratic preferences   1   2  areunobse rvableto ﬁrms
and are independently and identically type 1 extreme value
distributed. The buyer purchases the good that gives it the
highest net utility, so the probability that ﬁrm n makes a
saleis give n by






1+exp pn −p−n 
 
where p= p1 p 2  is the vector of prices and we adopt the
convention of using p−n to de notethepricecharge d by the
other ﬁrm.
State-to-State Transitions. From onepe riod to thene xt,
thetransition probabilitie s are
Pr e
 




1−  en  if e 
n =en +qn 
  en  if e 
n =en +qn −1 
where, at the upper and lower boundaries of the state
space , wemodify thetransition probabilitie s to be
Pr M  M 1 =1 and Pr 1 1 0 =1, respectively.
Bellman Equation and First-Order Condition. Deﬁne
Vn e  to be the expected net present value of ﬁrm n’s
cash ﬂows if theindustry is curre ntly in statee . Thevalue








Dk pn p −n e    Vnk e   (5)
where p−n e  is thepricecharge d by theothe r ﬁrm in
state e,   ∈  0 1  is thediscount factor, and   Vnk e  is the
expectation of ﬁrm n’s valuefunction conditional on the
buyer purchasing the good from ﬁrm k ∈  1 2  in state e
as given by








  Pr e
 
1  e1 1 Pr e
 
2  e2 0   (6)








  Pr e
 
1  e1 0 Pr e
 
2  e2 1   (7)
Thepolicy function pn   1     M  2 →  speciﬁes the
price pn e  that ﬁrm n sets in state e. To determine it,
let hn ·  bethemaximand in theBe llman e quation (5).
Differentiating hn ·  with respect to pn weobtain theﬁrst-
order condition
0=Dn pn p −n e   1− pn −c en  −   Vnn e +hn ·   
It is straightforward to show that thepricing de cision pn e 
is uniquely determined by the solution to the ﬁrst-order
condition.
Equilibrium. We restrict attention to symmetric
Markov-perfect equilibria. In a symmetric equilibrium the
pricing decision taken by ﬁrm 2 in state e is identical to the
pricing decision taken by ﬁrm 1 in state e 2 , i.e., p2 e  =
p1 e 2  , and similarly for thevaluefunction. It the re fore
sufﬁces to determine the value and policy functions of
ﬁrm 1, and wede ﬁneV  e  = V1 e  and p e  = p1 e  for
each state e. To simplify thenotation, wefurthe r de ﬁne
  Vk e  =   V1k e  to betheconditional e xpe ctation of ﬁrm
1’s valuefunction and Dk e  = Dk p e  p e 2    to bethe
probability that the buyer purchases from ﬁrm k ∈ 1 2  in
thestatee .
Parameterization. Wefocus on theways in which le arn-
ing by doing and organizational forgetting affect pricing
behavior, and the industry dynamics implied by that behav-
ior. Besanko et al. (2010a) prove that the model has a
uniquee quilibrium if  =0o r =1. It is therefore natural
to usethehomotopy me thod to traceout thee quilibrium
correspondence by varying   from 0 to 1. Wethus make
theforge tting rate  a function of the homotopy parameter
  and set
    = 
start +   
end − 
start  
In particular, if  start = 0 and  end = 1, then the homotopy
method traces out the equilibrium correspondence from
  0  = 0t o  1  = 1. To e xploretheroleof le arning by
doing, we repeat this procedure for 100 evenly spaced val-
ues of   ∈  0 01 1 . We hold the remaining parameters
ﬁxed at the values shown in Table 2.
System of Equations. Wearenow re ady to de scribethe
equilibrium as a system of equations in the form given by
(1). Deﬁne the vector of unknown values and policies in
equilibrium as
x= V 1 1  V 2 1      V M 1  V 1 2      V M M  
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Table 2. Parameter values.














Dk e   Vk e =0  (8)
H
2




Dk e   Vk e =0  (9)
whe rewesubstitutefor   V1 e  and   V2 e  using deﬁni-
tions (6) and (7) (imposing symmetry). The collection of
Equations (8) and (9) for all states e ∈  1     M  2 can be
written more compactly as










 1 1  x   
H1
 2 1  x   
     
H2










where 0 ∈ 2M2 is a vector of zeros. Any solution to this
system of 2M2 equations in 2M2 unknowns x ∈ 2M2 is a
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies (for a given value
of  ∈ 0 1 ).6
4.2. Equilibrium Correspondence
Figure2 shows thenumbe r of e quilibria as a function of
theprogre ss ratio   and theforge tting rate . Darker shades
indicate more equilibria. The subset of parameterizations
that yield three equilibria is fairly large, and we have found
up to ninee quilibria for somevalue s of   and  . Themul-
tiple equilibria describe a rich array of pricing behaviors
that aree conomically me aningful and that arequitedif-
ferent in terms of implied industry structure and dynamics
(see Besanko et al. 2010a for a discussion).
Re call that wemadetheforge tting rate  a function of
the homotopy parameter  . To visualizethese t of e qui-
libria as a correspondence of   for a speciﬁc value of  ,
we need a way to summarize each equilibrium as a sin-
glenumbe r. Thevaluefunction in theinitial state  1 1  is
thevalueof a ﬁrm at theonse t of theindustry; V 1 1  is
thus an economically meaningful summary of an equilib-
rium. Because we are also interested in long-run industry
concentration, we further compute the expected Herﬁndahl
Figure 2. Number of equilibria.



















inde x. Weproce e d in two ste ps. First, weusethepolicy
function to construct theprobability distribution ove r the
next period’s state e  given this period’s state e, and from
it wecomputethelimiting (or e rgodic) distribution ove r





e∈ 1     M 2
  D1 e  
2 + D2 e  
2  
  e  
Asymmetric industry structures arise and persist to the
extent that HHI  >0 5.
Figures 3 and 4 visualize the equilibrium correspondence
in terms of V 1 1  and HHI , respectively, for a variety of
different progress ratios  . If the system of equations that
characterizes the equilibria is regular, then there must be a
path conne cting theuniquee quilibria at   = 0 and  =1.
Multiple equilibria arise whenever this main path bends
back on itself. Similar to (A) in the left panel of Figure 1,
in thebottom-right pane l of Figure4, thepath from   = 0
to  =1 is S-shaped around  =0 1; when the sign of    s 
change s from positiveto ne gativeat   = 0 1181, thepath
is bending backward, and when the sign of    s  changes
from ne gativeto positiveat  =0 0745, thepath is be nding
forward.7 Consequently, Figure 2 indicates that there are
three equilibria in the vicinity of  =0 1 and  =0 05.
Wehavealso be e n ableto ide ntify oneor moreloops,
similar to (C) in thele ft pane l of Figure1, that aredis-
joint from the main path. These loops further add to the
multiplicity of equilibria. In the upper-left panel of Fig-
ure 4, for example, there is a loop around  =0 1; accord-
ingly, Figure2 indicate s that the rearethre ee quilibria in
thevicinity of   = 0 1 and   = 0 95. However, still other
loops may exist because, in order to trace out a loop, we
must ﬁrst somehow compute at least one equilibrium on the
loop. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine whether
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Figure 3. Initial ﬁrm value V 1 1 .

























































Figure 4. Limiting expected Herﬁndahl index HHI .
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been exhaustive. Figures 2–4 are therefore not necessarily
a comple temapping of thee quilibria.
In some places, the various paths appear to intersect one
another. A case in point is the loop in the upper-left panel
of Figure 4 that appears to twice intersect the path from
  = 0t o  = 1. Although such an intersection seems to
re se mblethebranching point (G) in theright pane l of Fig-
ure1, thefact that two e quilibria giveriseto thesame
expected Herﬁndahl index does not mean that the equilibria
themselves are the same. We have indeed veriﬁed that the
various solution paths do not intersect. Thus, the intersec-
tions in Figures 3 and 4 do not stem from violations of the
regularity requirement.
4.3. Performance
HOMPACK90 offers several different path-following algo-
rithms and storageformats for theJacobian of thesys-
tem of equations. Moreover, the user can compute the
Jacobian either numerically or analytically. To highlight
theimplications of the sechoice s for thepe rformanceof
HOMPACK90, we have conducted a series of experiments.
Throughout, wefocus on themain path of thee quilibrium
correspondence from  =0t o =1 for a progress ratio of
  = 0 75 (as shown in the upper-right panel of Figure 4).
Wese t thepre cision in HOMPACK90 to 10 −10 (see §5.5
for a discussion). WeuseADIFOR to analytically compute
the Jacobian. All experiments are conducted on a Linux
machinewith a 64-bit 1 GHz AMD Athlon CPU and 4 GB
of RAM.
Path-Following Algorithms. A major issueis the
trade-off between robustness and computation time. Com-
putation timeis theproduct of thenumbe r of ste ps it take s
to traceout thee ntirepath and theave ragetimepe r ste p.
This involves yet another trade-off because these two deter-
minants of computation timeareaffe cte d in oppositeways
by thesizeof theste p that thehomotopy algorithm take s
from onepoint to thene xt. Optimally adjusting theste p
sizeis a highly nontrivial proble m, and thealgorithm that
does this is a major part of HOMPACK90.
Turning to thechoiceof a spe ciﬁc path-following algo-
rithm, Watson et al. (1997) describe the normal ﬂow algo-
rithm as the baseline offering a reasonable compromise
between robustness and computation time. The ODE-based
algorithm is described as the most robust, but the slowest,
and the augmented Jacobian algorithm as the least robust,
but fastest.
Table 4. Performance: “Complicated” vs. “simple” segment of path.
“Complicated” ( ∈ 0 0 03 ) “Simple” ( ∈ 0 03 1 )
Algorithm/Jacobian Time (h:m) No. of steps Time/step (s) Time (h:m) No. of steps Time/step (s)
ODE-based/sparse, ana. 0:31 507 3 7 0:57 1 072 3 2
Normal ﬂow/sparse, ana. 0:18 292 3 9 1:26 1 905 2 8
Aug. Jacobian/sparse, ana. 0:26 290 5 4 2:17 1 905 4 3
Note. Learning-by-doing model.
Table 3. Performance: Path-following algorithms and
de nsevs. sparseJacobian.
Time No. of Time/step
Algorithm/Jacobian (h:m) steps (s)
ODE-based/dense, ana. 22:50 1 596 51 5
Normal ﬂow/dense, ana. 28:59 2 197 47 5
Aug. Jacobian/dense, ana. 25:25 2 250 40 7
ODE-based/sparse, ana. 1:28 1 579 03 4
Normal ﬂow/sparse, ana. 1:44 2 197 02 9
Aug. Jacobian/sparse, ana. 2:43 2 195 04 5
Note. Learning-by-doing model.
Table3 shows that theODE-base d algorithm is not
always slower than the other path-following algorithms. On
the contrary, in our experiments the ODE-based algorithm
turns out to befaste st: Whileit take s moretimeto comple te
each step, it takes fewer steps to complete the path.
To further investigate this somewhat unexpected ﬁnding,
in Table4 wecontrast thepe rformanceof thediffe re nt
path-following algorithms on se parateportions of thesolu-
tion path. The ODE-based algorithm is faster on the “sim-
ple” segment of the path ( ∈ 0 03 1 ) without multiplicity
and much curvature(so that theunknowns changegradu-
ally with the homotopy parameter), but slower on the “com-
plicated” segment of the path (  ∈  0 0 03 ). There ason
may lie in the different step-size adjustment procedures of
the different path-following algorithms. Indeed, as a closer
analysis of theoutput of HOMPACK90 re ve als, theODE-
based algorithm takes much larger (and thus fewer) steps
than theothe r path-following algorithms on the“simple ”
se gme nt of thepath. In contrast, on the“complicate d” se g-
ment of the path, the ODE-based algorithm takes much
smaller (and thus more) steps than the other path-following
algorithms.8
Returning to Table 3, the comparison between the normal
ﬂow and augmented Jacobian algorithms is not clear-cut
either. The dense augmented Jacobian algorithm takes less
time for each step but requires more steps, and this leads
to an overall decrease in computation time. In contrast, the
sparse augmented Jacobian algorithm takes more time for
each step but requires fewer steps, and this leads to an over-
all incre asein computation time . Although thesparseaug-
mented Jacobian algorithm takes only two fewer steps than
thesparsenormal ﬂow algorithm in Table3, Borkovsky
e t al. (2007) havefound that in someapplications both the
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algorithm sometimes take up to 20% fewer steps than their
normal ﬂow counterparts.
Jacobian. As is obvious from Table3, thede nseJaco-
bian algorithms require considerably more computation
time. A closer analysis reveals that the additional computa-
tion time required by the dense Jacobian algorithms is spent
performing linear algebra operations on the Jacobians.
Overall, this makes an overwhelmingly strong case for
using sparseJacobians.
With re gard to thede nseJacobian algorithms, wehave
found that the choice between a numerical, hand-coded
analytical, or ADIFOR-generated analytical Jacobian has a
negligible effect on the time per step. This is because the
timere quire d to computetheJacobian is dwarfe d by the
time required to solve the system of linear equations that
thealgorithm must solveto computethene xt ste p along
thepath.
Turning to thesparseJacobian algorithms, pre cision is a
ke y advantageof analytically compute d Jacobians. Table5
shows that although the ODE-based algorithm succeeds in
completing the solution path with an analytical Jacobian,
it fails to do so with a numerical Jacobian; in particular,
it spends much time tracing out a short segment of the
path and stops at  =0 096 where it reaches the maximum
number of steps.
On the other hand, the normal ﬂow algorithm requires
thesamenumbe r of ste ps to comple tethesolution path
regardless of whether an analytical or numerical Jacobian
is used. Interestingly, the path is computed more quickly
when a numerical Jacobian is used (presumably because
computing the numerical Jacobian requires less time than
computing theanalytical Jacobian dueto thecolumn-by-
column approach that ADIFOR requires to assemble to
Jacobian). Thus, it appears that the lower precision of the
numerical Jacobian is problematic for the ODE-based algo-
rithm but not for theothe r path-following algorithms. The
likely reason is that, in contrast to the other two path-
following algorithms, the ODE-based algorithm uses the
Jacobian not just in thecorre ctor, but also in thepre dictor
phase.
Overall, our results make an overwhelmingly strong case
for using sparseJacobians. The rearealso good re asons
to prefer analytical over numerical Jacobians, especially
Table 5. Performance: Path-following algorithms and
numerical vs. analytical Jacobian.
Time No. of Time/step
Algorithm/Jacobian (h:m) steps (s)
ODE-based/sparse, ana. 1:28 1 579 3 4
ODE-based/sparse, num. >6:27 >10 000 2 3
Normal ﬂow/sparse, ana. 1:44 2 197 2 9
Normal ﬂow/sparse, num. 1:22 2 197 2 3
Note. Learning-by-doing model.
because ADIFOR makes the process of computing ana-
lytical Jacobians very easy. Finally, we conclude that per-
formance is at least partly problem speciﬁc. We therefore
recommend conducting experiments on the particular appli-
cation at hand. The gains from experimentation can be sub-
stantial, and experimentation is virtually costless once the
system of equations and the Jacobian have been coded.
5. Example 2: The Quality Ladder Model
We next consider the quality ladder model of Pakes and
McGuire(1994). To simplify thee xposition, were strict
attention to a duopoly without entry and exit. The descrip-
tion of the model is abridged; please see Pakes and
McGuire(1994) for de tails.
5.1. Model
Firms and States. Thestateof ﬁrm n ∈  1 2  is  n ∈
 1     M  and reﬂects its product quality. The vector of
ﬁrms’ states is  =   1   2  ∈  1     M  2, and weuse
 2  to de notetheve ctor   2   1 . Each period, ﬁrms ﬁrst
compete in the product market and then make investment
decisions. The state in the next period is determined by
the stochastic outcomes of these investment decisions and
an industrywide depreciation shock that stems from an
incre asein thequality of an outsidealte rnative . In partic-
ular, ﬁrm n’s statee volve s according to thelaw of motion
  
n =  n +  n −  , where  n ∈  0 1  is a random variable
governed by ﬁrm n’s investment xn 0, and   ∈ 0 1  is an
industrywide depreciation shock. If  n = 1  the investment
is successful and the quality of ﬁrm n increases by one
level. The probability of success is  xn/ 1+ xn , where
 >0 is a measure of the effectiveness of investment. If
  = 1, the industry is hit by a depreciation shock and the
qualities of all ﬁrms decrease by one level; this happens
with probability  ∈ 0 1 .
Be low weﬁrst de scribethestatic mode l of product mar-
ket competition and then turn to investment dynamics.
Product Market Competition. Theproduct marke t is
characterized by price competition with vertically differen-
tiated products. There is a continuum of consumers. Each
consumer purchases at most one unit of one product. The
utility a consumer derives from purchasing product n is
g  n −pn + n, where




 n if 1 n  ∗ 
 ∗ +ln 2−exp  ∗ − n   if  ∗ <  n M
maps thequality of theproduct into theconsume r’s valua-
tion for it, pn is theprice , and  n represents the consumer’s
idiosyncratic preference for product n. There is an outside
alternative, product 0, that has utility  0. Assuming that the
idiosyncratic preferences   0   1   2  are independently and
ide ntically type1 e xtre mevaluedistribute d, thede mand for
ﬁrm n’s product is
Dn p  =m
exp g  n −pn 
1+
 2
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where p= p1 p 2  is the vector of prices and m>0 is the
sizeof themarke t (theme asureof consume rs).
Firm n chooses the price pn of product n to maximize
proﬁts. Hence, ﬁrm n’s proﬁts in state  are
 n  =max
pn
Dn pn p −n     pn −c  
where p−n   is thepricecharge d by theothe r ﬁrm and
c  0 is themarginal cost of production. Give n a state,
the ree xists a uniqueNash e quilibrium of theproduct mar-
ket game (Caplin and Nalebuff 1991). It is found easily
by numerically solving the system of ﬁrst-order conditions
corresponding to ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximization problem. Note
that the quality ladder model differs from the learning-by-
doing model in that product market competition does not
directly affect state-to-state transitions and, hence,  n  
can be computed before the Markov-perfect equilibria of
thedynamic stochastic gamearecompute d via thehomo-
topy method. This allows us to treat  n   as a primitive
in what follows.
Bellman Equation and Complementary Slackness
Condition. Deﬁne Vn   to be the expected net present
valueof ﬁrm n’s cash ﬂows if theindustry is curre ntly in
state . Thevaluefunction Vn   1     M  2 → is implic-
itly deﬁned by the Bellman equation
Vn  =max
xn0















where   ∈  0 1  is thediscount factor and W  n
n    is the
expectation of ﬁrm n’s valuefunction conditional on an
investment success ( n = 1) and failure(  n = 0), respec-
t i v el y ,a sg i v enb y
W
 n
n   =
 
 ∈ 0 1   −n∈ 0 1 
 
  1−  
1− 
 
 x−n  





1+ x−n  
 1− −n
×Vn max min  n + n −  M  1  
max min  −n + −n −  M  1    (12)
where x−n   is the investment of the other ﬁrm in state .
Note that the min and max operators merely enforce the
bounds of thestatespace .
Thepolicy function xn   1     M  2 →  0    speciﬁes
the investment of ﬁrm n in state . Solving themaximiza-
tion proble m on theright-hand sideof theBe llman e quation
(11), we obtain the complementary slackness condition
−1+ 
 

















The investment decision xn   is uniquely determined by




max 1    W 1
n  −W 0
n    
 
  (14)
Equilibrium. We restrict attention to symmetric
Markov-perfect equilibria. In a symmetric equilibrium, the
investment decision taken by ﬁrm 2 in state  is identical
to the investment decision taken by ﬁrm 1 in state  2 , i.e.,
x2   = x1  2  , and similarly for thevaluefunctions. It
therefore sufﬁces to determine the value and policy func-
tions of ﬁrm 1, and wede ﬁneV    = V1   and x   =
x1   for each state . Similarly, wede ﬁneW  1   =
W
 1
1    for each state .
Parameterization. Weallow thehomotopy algorithm to
vary   and  :
 
    









 end − start
 end − start
 
 
For example, if  start = 0 and  end = 1 while  start =  end,
then the homotopy algorithm traces out the equilibrium cor-
respondence from   0  = 0t o  1  = 1. In general, given
any starting and ending values for the parameter vector, the
homotopy algorithm can traceout an e ntirepath of e qui-
libria by moving along thelinein parame te r spacethat
connects the starting and ending values. The effectiveness
of investment   is a natural parameter to vary because the
equilibrium trivially involves no investment if  =0. More-
over, this equilibrium is unique. In addition to  , weallow
therateof de pre ciation   to vary because experience sug-
gests that the rate of depreciation is often a key determinant
of industry structure and dynamics (see, e.g., Besanko and
Doraszelski 2004, Besanko et al. 2010b). Note that in the
quality ladder model the equilibrium is not unique at  =0
(se eFigure5) and may not beuniqueat  =1. Wehold the
remaining parameters ﬁxed at the values shown in Table 6.
Figure 5. Number of equilibria.
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Table 6. Parameter values.
Parameter Mm c  ∗  
Value18 5 5 12 0  925
Note. Quality ladder model.
5.2. The Zangwill and Garcia (1981) Reformulation
of the Complementary Slackness Condition
Dueto thenonne gativity constraint on inve stme nt in the
quality ladder model, we obtained a complementary slack-
ness condition instead of a ﬁrst-order condition as in the
learning-by-doing model in §4. To apply the homotopy
method, we must reformulate the system of equations and
inequalities in (13) as a system of equations.
Consider a general complementary slackness condition
on a scalar variable x:
A x 0 
B x 0  (15)
A x B x =0 
where A x  and B x  arefunctions of x. Zangwill and
Garcia (1981, pp. 65–68) offer a reformulation of the com-
plementary slackness condition that consists entirely of
equations that are continuously differentiable to an arbitrary
degree. The idea is to introduce another scalar variable  
and consider the system of equations
A x + max 0    
k =0  (16)
B x + max 0 −   
k =0  (17)
where k ∈. From Equations (16) and (17), it follows that
  =

    
    
 −A x  1/k if A x <0 
− −B x  1/k if B x <0 
0i f A x =B x =0 
(18)
Using thefact that max  0 −  × max 0   = 0 and the
solution for   in Equation (18), it is easy to see that the
system of Equations (16) and (17) is equivalent to the com-
plementary slackness condition in (15). Moreover, this sys-
tem is  k−1  times continuously differentiable with respect
to  . Although wetakek = 2 in what follows, wecould
easily satisfy the smoothness requirement of the homotopy
method by choosing a larger value for k.
The Quality Ladder Model. The complementary
slackness condition (13) can be restated as
− 1+ x   
2 +   W
1  −W
0   0 
x   − 1+ x  
2 +   W
1  −W
0    =0  (19)
x  0 
whe reweusethefact that wefocus on symme tric e quilib-
ria in order to eliminate ﬁrm indices and multiply through
by  1+ x   2 to simplify thee xpre ssion. Applying the
Zangwill and Garcia (1981) reformulation to the comple-
mentary slackness condition (19) yields the equations
− 1+ x   
2+   W
1  −W
0   
+ max 0      
k=0  (20)
−x  + max 0 −     
k=0  (21)
Thete rms  max 0      k and  max 0 −     k
serve as slack variables that ensure that the inequali-
ties in (13) are satisﬁed and the fact that max 0      ×
max 0 −    =0 ensures that the equality in (13) holds.
We can now proceed to deﬁne the system of homotopy
equations using Equations (20) and (21) along with the
Bellman equation
−V  + 1  −x  
+ 
 
 x  









whe rewesubstitutefor W 1   and W 0   using deﬁni-
tion (12) (imposing symmetry). This yields a system of 3M2
equations in the 3M2 unknowns V 1 1      V M M ,
x 1 1      x M M , and   1 1        M M .
Two problems arise. First, because we have added the
slack variables, this system of equations is relatively large
with 3M2 equations and unknowns. This leads to increased
memory requirements and computation time. Second, this
system of equations yields an extremely sparse Jacobian.
Notethat therows of theJacobian corre sponding to Equa-
tion (21) each have only one or two nonzero elements. Also
notethat e ach column of theJacobian corre sponding to
a slack variable has only one nonzero element. We have
found that such a Jacobian tends to cause HOMPACK90’s
sparse linear equation solver to fail; this is discussed further
in §5.6.
We address these problems by solving Equation (21) for
x  = max 0 −     
k  (23)
and then substituting for x   in Equations (20) and (22).9
This reduces the system of 3M2 equations in 3M2
unknowns to a system of 2M2 equations in 2M2 unknowns.
Moreover, it eliminates the rows and columns of the
Jacobian that included only one or two nonzero elements;
thus, wehavee liminate d thee xce ssivesparsity that te nds to
cause HOMPACK90’s sparse linear equation solver to fail.
To this end, deﬁne the vector of unknowns in equilib-
rium as
x= V 1 1  V 2 1      V M 1  V 1 2      V M M  
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Thee quations in state are
H
1
 x   =−V  + 1  −x  
+ 
 
 x  











 x   =− 1+ x   
2+   W
1  −W
0   
+ max 0      
k=0  (25)
whe rewesubstitutefor W 1   and W 0   using deﬁni-
tion (12) (imposing symmetry) and for x   using deﬁni-
tion (23). Notethat (24) and (25) aree quations that areuse d
to construct the system of homotopy equations, whereas
(12) and (23) are simply deﬁnitional shorthands for terms
that appear in Equations (24) and (25). The collection of
Equations (24) and (25) for all states ∈ 1     M  2 can
bewritte n morecompactly as










 1 1  x   
H1
 2 1  x   
     
H2










where 0 ∈ 2M2 is a vector of zeros. Any solution to this
system of 2M2 equations in 2M2 unknowns, x ∈2M2  is a
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies (for a given value
of   ∈  0 1 ).10 The equilibrium investment decision x  
in state  is recovered by substituting the equilibrium slack
variable     into deﬁnition (23).
Our approach of replacing a model variable with a slack
variablecan betake n only if oneof thee quations in the
Zangwill and Garcia (1981) formulation admits a closed-
form solution for a model variable. (In the case of the
quality ladder model, we solved Equation (21) for the
investment decision x  .) This is always thecaseif a
model variable is constrained to be above/below a constant,
as with thenonne gativity constraint in thequality ladde r
mode l. Howe ve r, it is possiblethat noneof thee quations
in theZangwill and Garcia (1981) formulation admits a
closed-form solution for a model variable. Suppose, for
e xample , weimposean uppe r bound on thesum of ﬁrms’
investments in each state, i.e., xn   +x−n     L   ,i n
the quality ladder model (say because ﬁrms are compet-
ing for a scare resource). Then, in solving an equation
corresponding to (16) or (17) for xn  , oneﬁnds that
xn   = f   n   x−n    = f   n   xn  2   . That is,
theclose d-form solution for ﬁrm n’s policy in state  ,
xn  , is a function of its rival’s policy in state , x−n  ,
and thus its own policy in state  2 , xn  2  . In this case,
it is impossibleto ﬁnd a close d-form solution for xn  
as a function of only  n  , and thus it is impossibleto
eliminate the model variable xn  . On theothe r hand, in
this case, the Jacobian of the system formulated using the
“pure” version of the Zangwill and Garcia (1981) formula-
tion is no longer as sparse, thereby reducing our motivation
for replacing a model variable with a slack variable in the
ﬁrst place.
5.3. Equilibrium Correspondence
Figure5 shows thenumbe r of e quilibria as a function of the
effectiveness of investment   and the rate of depreciation  .
Wehavefound up to thre ee quilibria for somevalue s of  
and  . The extent of multiplicity is not nearly as dramatic
as in the learning-by-doing model.
To visualize the equilibrium correspondence, we graph






∈ 1     M 2
  D1 p     
2
+ D2 p     
2  
T   
where  T is the transient distribution over states in period
T ∈ 10 100 1 000 , starting from state  1 1  in period 0.
Weusetransie nt distributions rathe r than thelimiting dis-
tribution as in the learning-by-doing model because there
may be several closed communicating classes.11
As can be seen in Figure 6, industry concentration, both
in theshort and in thelong run, is affe cte d by   and  
in nontrivial ways. Whereas the homotopy algorithm com-
putes continuous solution paths, the expected Herﬁndahl
indices in Figure 6 appear to change almost discontinuously
in someplace s. This happe ns be causetheshapeof the
transie nt distribution, and with it thevalueof thee xpe cte d
Herﬁndahl index, changes abruptly as investment in certain
states goes to zero. In particular, if investment in state  1 1 
is zero, then both ﬁrms are stuck at the lowest-possible
quality level. As soon as x 1 1 >0, however, the indus-
try takes off, thereby giving rise to a nontrivial transient
distribution that assigns positiveprobability to asymme tric
industry structures. For example, with   = 0 7 investment
rises from zero to positive around   = 2 17 to causethe
abrupt change in the expected Herﬁndahl index in the left
panel of Figure 6; with  =3 investment drops from posi-
tiveto ze ro around  =0 74 in theright pane l.
Figure7 illustrate s theability of thehomotopy algorithm
to crisscross the parameter space.12 It combines several
slices through the equilibrium correspondence to show how
the expected Herﬁndahl index HHI1 000 depends jointly on
the effectiveness of investment   and therateof de pre cia-
tion  .
To illustratewhy themultiplicity that is displaye d in Fig-
ure5 is not disce rniblein Figure7, wediscuss thethre e
e quilibria that wehavefound at   = 1 8 and  =0 05.
Across these equilibria, investment differs most in state
 15 15 , where it is 0, 0 0092, and 0 0365. Table 7 presents
the corresponding transient distributions  1 000 in a subset
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Figure 6. Transient expected Herﬁndahl index HHIT at T ∈  10 100 1 000  along   with   = 0 7 (left panel) and
along   with  =3 (right panel).





































Note. Quality ladder model.
in investment lead to qualitative differences in industry
structure; whereas the equilibria in the left and middle
pane ls giveriseto transie nt distributions  1 000 with sym-
metric modal state  15 15 , thee quilibrium in theright
panel gives rise to a transient distribution  1 000 with asym-
metric modal states  15 16  and  16 15 . Despite this,
the expected Herﬁndahl indices are virtually identical (and
equal to 0 5000) because signiﬁcant differences between
thetransie nt distributions  1 000 are limited to states in
which each ﬁrm has a quality level greater than  ∗ = 12.
Figure 7. Transient expected Herﬁndahl index


























Note. Quality ladder model.
For this subse t of thestatespace , a changein thestate
has a negligible impact on product market competition and,
accordingly, on theHe rﬁndahl inde x.
5.4. Scalability
To asse ss thescalability of HOMPACK90, wechangethe
number of quality levels M, and thus the number of equa-
tions 2M2, and adjust thequality cutoff  ∗ accordingly. We
trace out the equilibrium correspondence along  ∈ 0 15 
with   = 0 7 held ﬁxed. From Table 8 it appears that the
total computation time increases more than linearly in the
number of equations. It is to be expected that the time per
step increases in the number of equations because solving
the systems of linear equations described in §3.1 becomes
more burdensome. More surprisingly, the number of steps
increases in the number of equations.
Table 7. Transient distributions  1 000 for thethre e
equilibria at  =1 8 and  =0 05.
15 16 15 16 15 16
15 0.6888 10−5 15 0 4274 0 1418 15 0 1921 0 2683
16 10−5 01 6 0 1418 0 0021 16 0 2683 0 0139
Note. Quality ladder model.
Table 8. Scalability: Normal ﬂow algorithm with sparse
analytic Jacobian.
No. of Time No. of Time/step
M  ∗ equations (h:m:s) steps (s)
9 6 162 0:00:15 931 0 02
18 12 648 0:24:27 7 608 0 19
27 18 1 458 5:08:27 21 457 0 86
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There ason is thefollowing. Re call from §5.2 that the
quality ladder model exhibits a kink as the investment in
a stateswitche s from ze ro to positiveor viceve rsa in
response to a change in the parameter values (see Equa-
tion (14)). WhiletheZangwill and Garcia (1981) re formu-
lation of the complementary slackness condition smoothes
out this kink, it inevitably does so by introducing additional
curvatureinto thesolution path. This force s thehomotopy
algorithm to take small steps. Moreover, the larger the state
space , themorekinks the repote ntially arein thequality
ladde r mode l and themoreadditional curvatureis intro-
duced by the Zangwill and Garcia (1981) reformulation.
This argument implies that the homotopy algorithm should
take large steps and proceed quickly as long as the solu-
tion path does not exhibit kinks. Indeed, irrespective of the
sizeof thestatespace , thehomotopy algorithm take s fe we r
than a hundred steps to traverse the segment along which
investment is positive for all states; the rest of the steps are
needed to trace out the segment along which investment in
somestateswitche s from ze ro to positiveor viceve rsa.
5.5. Troubleshooting
If HOMPACK90 successfully follows a path to its end, it
indicates a normal ending (exit ﬂag 1). The end of the
path may be associated with either   = 1o r  = 0. The
latter case, in turn, may indicate genuine multiplicity of
e quilibria (se ecase(B) in Figure1) or that thehomotopy
algorithm “turned around” and backtracked along the path
until it returned to the starting point. HOMPACK90 may
also fail to follow a path to its end for other reasons. In
the remainder of this section, we detail several types of
failures that may occur and give tips for troubleshooting
these problems.
With any typeof failure , it is good practiceto ﬁrst ve rify
that the regularity and smoothness requirements are sat-
isﬁe d. To che ck for re gularity, wecomputethecondition
numbe rs of Jacobians along thepath. If thecondition num-
bers increase as the homotopy algorithm approaches the
point of failure, it is very likely due to a violation of the
regularity requirement.13 It may bepossibleto avoid this
typeof failureby making a small changein theparame -
ter values of the model or by relaxing the precision setting
so that HOMPACK90 takes larger steps and is thus more
likely to “skip over” the singularity.
The homotopy algorithm does not check for smoothness,
and it is entirely possible that it successfully follows a path
to its end even if the smoothness requirement is violated. In
general, however, it is advisable to formulate the problem
such that the smoothness requirement is satisﬁed (see §5.2).
HOMPACK90 may abort if the precision setting is too
stringent (exit ﬂags 2 and 6) or too lax (exit ﬂag 5). In the
latter case, the homotopy algorithm takes a step and ends
up too far from thepath to beableto re turn to it; this ofte n
happens on segments with high curvature. The solution is
to adjust the precision setting.
HOMPACK90 may reach the maximum number of steps
(exit ﬂag 3). Although the obvious solution is to increase
the maximum number of steps, it is worth investigating if
the homotopy algorithm proceeds slowly because the pre-
cision setting is too stringent. The tighter the precision
se tting, thenarrowe r the“band” around thesolution path
in which thehomotopy algorithm aims to stay and, thus,
the smaller the steps that it takes. Also recall from §4.3
that the numerical Jacobian often lacks the precision that
allows theODE-base d algorithm to takelong ste ps and pro-
ceed quickly. Finally, in the normal ﬂow and augmented
Jacobian algorithms, themaximum ste p size(as se t in the
input variableSSPAR(5)) can beincre ase d.
If the homotopy algorithm progresses very slowly in
thevicinity of theinitial condition, the n a use ful trick is
to allow thehomotopy algorithm to inste ad be gin at the
parameterization originally designated as the end point and
proceed “backwards” toward the parameterization origi-
nally designated as the starting point. This may alleviate the
problem in cases where it allows the homotopy algorithm
to approach these gme nt of high curvaturefrom a se gme nt
of low curvature. We suspect that this occurs because some
of thepath-following algorithms—name ly, thenormal ﬂow
and augmented Jacobian algorithms—predict the next step
on the solution path using several previous steps. A seg-
ment of low curvature on the solution path may therefore
providethehomotopy algorithm with “data” on thepath
that serves as a good indication of the direction in which
to proceed.
If a solution path gets sufﬁciently close to another,
the n thehomotopy algorithm may jump from onepath to
another and, in doing so, may fail to traverse the path in its
entirety. Similarly, the homotopy algorithm may also jump
between one or more segments of the same path. If path
jumping is suspected to occur, then it is advisable to tighten
the precision setting and/or decrease the maximum step size
in orde r to forcethehomotopy algorithm to re main close
to the desired solution path.
5.6. The Linear Solver
All thepath-following algorithms must solvea syste m of
linear equations of the form Az = b in each step, where
thematrix A is constructed from the Jacobian  H y / y
(Equation (4) in thecaseof theODE-base d algorithm
and the Newton iteration in the corrector step of all three
algorithms).14 The ﬁnal and perhaps most troubling reason
that HOMPACK90 may fail to follow a path to its end is a
failureof theline ar solve r (e xit ﬂag 4). This occurs if the
Jacobian is (nearly) singular; again, it is good practice to
verify that the regularity requirement is satisﬁed. If this is
the case, it is likely that the linear solver cannot handle the
problem at hand.
Thede nseand sparsealgorithms in HOMPACK90 diffe r
not only in thestorageformat of theJacobian, but also
in the low-level numerical linear algebra routines. In our
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robust, whereas the sparse linear solver has sometimes
faile d. Thede nsealgorithms in HOMPACK90 useQR
decomposition—a direct method—to solve linear systems.
Thesparsealgorithms usetheite rativege ne ralize d minimal
residual (GMRES) method (Saad and Schultz 1986) coupled
with incomplete LU (ILU) preconditioning. Thus, HOM-
PACK90 solves  Q−1A z =  Q−1b , where Q is theILU
preconditioner of A. Q is chosen to make  Q−1A  closeto
diagonal and easy to evaluate.
Both LayneWatson (theprincipal author of
HOMPACK90) and Ken Judd (an authority on numerical
methods in economics) acknowledge that the GMRES
method can and does fail for some problems. There is no
guidance as to which problems are susceptible, but we
strongly suspect problems with extremely sparse Jacobians.
As explained in §5.2, constructing a system of equations
for the quality ladder model using the “pure” version of
theZangwill and Garcia (1981) formulation yie lds such a
sparseJacobian. In §5.2 wehavethe re foreshown how to
re ducethesizeand sparsity of theJacobian by e liminating
variables.
In addition, wealso offe r thefollowing sugge stions:
(i) Reorder the unknowns and/or equations to change the
orde r of thecolumns and rows of theJacobian. (ii) Use
thede nsealgorithms if thedime nsion of theproble m is
less than several hundred equations. (iii) Increase the limit
on the number of GMRES iterations and/or increase the
“k” in GMRES k . (GMRES k  is restarted every k itera-
tions until the residual norm is small enough; see Watson
et al. 1997.) (iv) Remove the ILU preconditioning and use
GMRES by itself to solve the linear system. (v) Replace
thesparseline ar solve r in HOMPACK90. 15
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a step-by-step guide to solving
dynamic stochastic games using the homotopy method. We
discuss the theory of the homotopy method and its imple-
mentation and present two detailed examples of dynamic
stochastic games that are solved using this method. We
refer the reader to Zangwill and Garcia (1981) for a com-
prehensive treatment of the theory of the homotopy method
and to Allgower and Georg (1992) for a discussion of
numerical methods for implementing it.
In this pape r weusethehomotopy me thod to traceout
an entire path of solutions to a system of equations by
varying oneor moreparame te rs of themode l. This typeof
application is referred to as a natural-parameter homotopy.
The homotopy method has other applications. A so-called
artiﬁcial homotopy can beuse d to obtain a solution for a
particular parameterization of a system of equations; it aims
to computejust onee quilibrium. Artiﬁcial homotopie s have
been widely used to compute Nash equilibria in normal
and extensive form games (see Herings and Peeters 2010
and the references therein) and to solve general equilibrium
models (see Eaves and Schmedders 1999 and the references
therein), in particular, models with incomplete asset mar-
kets (Schmedders 1998, 1999). See Berry and Pakes (2007)
for an application to estimating demand systems.
An all-solutions homotopy can sometimes be used to
obtain all solutions to a system of equations with certain
properties such as the polynomial system that characterizes
the Nash equilibria of a ﬁnite game (see, e.g., McKelvey
and McLennan 1996). All-solutions homotopies to solve for
all Nash equilibria of a ﬁnite game have been implemented
in thefre e ly availablesoftwarepackageGambit (McKe lve y
et al. 2006). They are used by Bajari et al. (2010) to com-
pute equilibria of static games of incomplete information
and by Bajari et al. (2009a, b) within the context of esti-
mation algorithms. Judd and Schmedders (2006) construct
a computational uniqueness proof for a class of dynamic
stochastic games in which movements through the state
spaceareunidire ctional and theprimitive s aregive n by
polynomials. We refer the reader to Sommese and Wampler
(2005) for a recent treatment of all-solutions homotopies.
Endnotes
1. Boldface is used throughout to distinguish between vec-
tor and scalars.
2. Themathe matical lite ratureon thehomotopy me thod
rules out paths like (D) by imposing a boundary freeness
requirement (see, e.g., Zangwill and Garcia 1981, Chap-
ter 3).
3. Moreformally, (G) is a so-calle d pitchfork bifurcation.
The regularity requirement also rules out transcritical (X-
shaped) bifurcations, but is consistent with other types of
bifurcations (saddlenodeand doublesaddlenode ). Se e
Golubitsky and Schaeffer (1985) for an introduction to
bifurcation theory.
4. This functionality was added by us and is not a part of
theoriginal HOMPACK90.
5. ADIFOR can beobtaine d at http://www-unix.mcs.anl.
gov/autodiff/ADIFOR/. Links to other automatic differenti-
ation packages can be found at http://www.autodiff.org.
6. A slightly modiﬁed version of Proposition 2 in
Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) establishes that such
an equilibrium always exists.
7. Theorie ntation of thepath take n by thehomotopy
method is arbitrary and can be reversed by reversing the
signs of the basic differential equations (3).
8. Further investigation revealed that the normal ﬂow and
augmented Jacobian algorithms indeed limit the maximum
ste p size(as se t in theinput variableSSPAR(5)). Weke pt
it at thede fault valueto makefor a morefair comparison
between the different path-following algorithms. Increasing
themaximum ste p sizealso appe ars to incre asethelike -
lihood that thehomotopy algorithm strays from thesolu-
tion path.
9. We thank Karl Schmedders for suggesting this approach.
10. Theorem 1 in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010)
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11. A closed communicating class is a subset of states that
the industry never leaves once it has entered it. The tran-
sie nt distributions that wecomputeaccount for theprob-
ability of re aching any oneof theclose d communicating
classes.
12. Wethank Paul Grie co for producing Figure7. The
algorithm presented in Grieco (2008) uses HOMPACK90
to trace out paths in the equilibrium correspondence along
multiple dimensions of the parameter space and, in doing
so, it computes the largest connected subset of the equilib-
rium correspondence that includes the initial condition.
13. A matrix is singular if its condition number is inﬁnite.
A large condition number signiﬁes that a matrix is nearly
singular (Judd 1998, pp. 67–70).
14. TheJacobian  H y / y is an  N ×  N + 1   matrix,
whereas the linear solver requires a square matrix. All
three path-following algorithms therefore add a row to the
Jacobian. This extra row is simply a basis vector in the
caseof theODE-base d and normal ﬂow algorithms and a
ve ctor that is tange nt to thesolution path in thecaseof the
augmented Jacobian algorithm.
15. Theauthors thank LayneWatson for someof the se
suggestions and warn the reader that implementing some
of them requires in-depth knowledge of HOMPACK90.
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